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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STArl'E O.F' UTAH, by and Through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
- vs. F'. FJPHHAil\f BATES and
MAF. I'. BATES,
Dr;feudants and Appellants.

Case
No.10910

RESPO,NDENT'S BRIEF
srrA TE ME NT OF THE CASE
This is an action in eminent domain brought by the
Stah Road Commission and this action is ancillary to a
J!llOJ' action. rrhe original proceeding in eminent domain
inrolved the taking of land for the Interstate Highway
proper, and tlw ancillary proceeding was for land to
ronstruct a Rtock trail along the Interstate Highway.
'f'lie Respondent claims that severance damage ·was paid
to tlt1' Appc•llants in the prior proceeding which included
ilanrngps fur loss of access to water in Silver Creek and,
lhrrefor<', is uot obligated to pay for the same loss of
'r:1tPr and aeress in the second proceeding. Appellants
1

1

claim that Respondent is obligated to furniRlt 11 at 1,1 or
pay additional compensation in tlw ancillary prncePdiii~
DISPOSITION IN LO"\VER C'OUHT
The case was pre-tried and tried to the Co11l't, Nt 011 _
art M. Hanson, .Judge, presiding without a jmy, and tlir·
Court granted .Judgment of $3:> per a ere JHHsu;rn( io
stipulation of counsels, on 8.71 aen•s taken by the B1·pondent for the construction of the stoek trnil. ']1]i 1,
Court also found that the Appellants ha(1 het•n paid for
the loss of aecess to their water by the prior easr which
was settled between the parties, and tlH'r0forP, ~tppel
lants "\Vere not entitled to furtht>r ReYeraue(• dmnngr 011
the ancillary proceeding.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent Reeks an affirnia11cr of tltr
trial Court's finding and .Judgment to the effret that tlw
Defendants-Appellants are not entitled to further .,ererance damage for loss of aecess to their 1rntrr in th':
ancillary proceeding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1959, the Utah State Road Commission hega11
land acquisition in the area known as Siker Creek Canyon which extends approximately from Siln•r CrePk
Junction to Wanship, Summit County, Utal1. Thr land
acquisition program was part of the onrall Intrrst:tll'
construction program and the land of the A ppellanh "ri'
part of the land acquired for the construction of tl11 lit
terstate High·way.
2

Prior to the construction of the Interstate High,1 ay, the Appellants watered their livestock in Silver
( 'rt'L'lc 8 tream by crossing the old highway which separated Appellants' land from Silver Creek. The new Interclate system, pursuant to Interntate requirements,
rloe, 1111t permit crossings across the highway and, theref1,n·, tl1r A ppdlants' right to iugress and egress from
rlll'ir rf'maining land had to be purchased by paying the
.1ppellm1ts severance damage. One of the items of sevf'l'i\llt'e 1lnmnge was the loss of access to the water in Sil1r·r Creek as indicated by exhibits P-5 and P-6, which
11rr· npprnisals, oMaiued h>' the Utah State Road Commi~sion. Based upon such appraisals, a warrant>T deed,
(r·xhihit P-2) was signed hy the Appellants conveying to
thr 11tali State Road Commission, the necessary land and
thr ah:-:olutc right to control ingress and egress from the
.\pp1'llants' larnl to or from the new Interstate system.
In '·011sideration for the c01weyance of land and the right
!11 eon I rnl ingress and egress to and from the Interstate
'lc:tcm from Appellants' land, the Utah State Road Commissio11 paid to Appellants, the sum of $8864.00, plus
i11tPrPst (exhibit P-3).

In 1963, the Utah State Road Commission initiated
proceNlings to acquire additional land for the construclion of certain stock trails along the Interstate system
from Sih·cr Creek Junction to Wanship, and the Apprllm1tf::' land was again affected by the project. The
lm1d being taken by Respondent, the Utah State Road
l'11mmissio11, borders along the now eonstructed Inter'tntP s)·stem and the Appellants claim that they are
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again entitled to compensation for the los8 of acci,,,
to water in Silver Creek. The Respondent denies th;ii
they are again entitled to such compensation sinrt· t]i,,
original settlement included payment for control of
Appellants' access to the water.
Based upon the controversy aho\'e descrihrd thrcase was pretried and subsequently tried hy the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, sitting ·without a jm).
Counsel for Respondent was not certain as to what relief
Appellants sought at the trial level exc<:>pt for the fact
that Appellants, throughout the entire trial. insi8trd that '
they were entitled to severance damage on tlw ancilfory
case. However, the arguments submitted by Counsel for
Appellants appeared to he direeted to-wards mistake anr1
misrepresentation and as such, appeare<l to be directed
towards a recision of the original contract.
1

Therefore, at pre-trial and prior to such datt>, corn1sel for the Respondent offered the Appellants an opportunity to try all of the issues including the is8ues of ~e\'
Erance damage from the initial taking and the i8sucs of
loss of access to Silver Creek by the construction of tltP
Highway itself and the stock trail, provided, howewr.
that the Appellants return to the Respondent the sum of
$8864.00, plus interest, which had been paid hy the prior
settlement. At the pre-trial, the same offer was again
made to the Appellants by counsel for the Rcspondeu1
and the Court initially ruled that the Appellants refn 111l
the money to Respondent and the issues of compcm;atiun
and damages arising from the construction of the highway and the construction of the stock trail lw pla('Pd lw4

1

lore the court in an effort to arrive at an eciuitable clis-

1111.sition (If the entire case.

;inc

]:i

(TR Feb. 17, 1967, Page 12,
tl1rough page 19, line 2.)

'J'lw Apprllants, however, decided against refund;11!( 1]1P money obtained by them through the prior pro1·1 cdiup; a 11c1, therefore a trial was held on the issues of
] 11 ]1(! value for tl1e
ancillary proceeding and also inl'irnli!rl in that trial was the issue of whether or not com1w11satio11 for loss of access to the water should be m1l111lcc1 as damages in the ancillary proceeding.
'rhe Court ruled that the Appellants were entitled
to tlll' y;Jlue of the land taken in the ancillary proceeding
hnt that the Appellants were not entitled to further severance clamnge 011 the land remaining, since the AppelLrnt< had heen prrviously paid for the loss of access to
tilt· watrr h~, the earlier proceeding.

ARGUMENT
POINTS I AND II
'l1HE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
'l1HAT THE PURPORTED AGREEMENT BY
ALDEN S. ADAMS WAS NOT BINDING AND
THAT THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY FURTHER COMPENSATION .
.\ prwllants' ar,g·ument of Point One and Point Tvvo
the same and arise from the same faciunl ~it nation and, therefore, Respondent will submit its
ni~unwnts of Point One and Point Two under one
l11•adino·
,.,.
,ir1· ~nh~tantially
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The Appellants attack the finding of the Coutt 111 ·
stating that the Court erred in finding the rnnporri. 11
agreement made by Alden S. Adams was 110t hill!]ii. 1..
upon the Respondents. The Appellants suggest th:i,
there was no evidence contradicting their position that
the letters written by Alden S. Adams (D-7 and D-~I
were, in fact, binding upon the State. This eontcntion,
however, presumes that the letters heretoforl' ref~rrPd
to were either contracts in and of themselves or tlrnt thr 1
were an integral part of the right of way agreement mi1I
the warranty deed executed hy the Appellants i11 faYo1·
of the Respondent. The letters, lwwever, arr not sufficiently clear to be called contracts i11 and of tltemsp]w,
and do not specify any contingeneies for the signing- of
the warranty deed or the right nf way contract. ThP
right of way contract and the warrant_\' deed do not in
any way ref er to any contingencies nor refer to the letters written by Alden S. Adams. Therefore, it mu>t
he presumed that the Trial Court did not feel that tli
letters created any contractual obligation other thm1 il)
specified in the warranty deed and the right of waY
contract.
1
•

Even if it were to be conceded, for the Rake of thi>
argument, that the the letters referred to by the Appellants created contractual liability in favor of ..:\ppellauti
and against Respondent, the question of whether or not
the State Road Commission could be bound hy such cn 11 ·
tract would still be in issue in that the authority of ,\Jr
Alden S. Adams would have to be ascertained and e~
tablished. Appellants argue that Mr. Adams was ve.,frll
with sufficient authority and discretion to hind the State
6

1

Hoad Commission to whatever terms Mr. Adams determined m~c·Pssa ry for the procurement of Appellants'
lnJ1d. To support this contention, Appellants cite 43
1111 , .!ttr, 71, Srdion 254. However, Appellants cite only
il'ltctt is connmient for them to argue and omit such parts
!I.~ nre pertinent to the question before the Court. The
inw mcm1i11g of the section is conveyed in the following
,~utcnces:

"vVhen power or jurisdiction is delegated to any
publif' officer over a subject matter and its exereise is confided to his discretion, the acts done in
the exercise of the authority are, in general, binding and valid as to the subject matter. The only
(jllCStion 1ch ich can arise between an individual and
the public, or any person denying the rnlidity
n re zw ICC r in the officer and frand in the party."
(F~mphasis added)

'l'hc citation goes on further to say:
unauthorized act or declaration of an officer
does not Pstop the government from insisting on
its incalidity." Id. Page 72. (Emphasis added)
"~1n

In further support of Appellants' position, they cite
±3 Am, .fur. 85, Section 273. Appellants claim that this
section stands for the proposition that all that is necessary for the letters written by Mr. Alden S. Adams to
he binding upon the State is to show that the matters
propor-;cd hy 1\fr. Adams need only have been more or less
counPdecl with his general duties. However, the section
1rn tNl h.1' Appellants does not support this contention
aud i:-: quoted out of context by Appellants. The citation
l'onwl in Appellants' brief on page 15, refers to the
lialiil1ty of a public officer for acts committed beyond
1

1
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his authority and refers to the question of his per~r, 1 ,1
liability and not to the validity of any contractual 0 111;
gations created by him beyond the scope of his autlj()ri:)
Moreover, the question of agency being a Yitai qul,
tion of the Appellants' case, should be i:;iven somr co 11 _
sideration and merits sornc> discussion. In :1 Am. J 11 r. 2d
481, 482, Section 77, we find the following statement 0r
the law:
"It is always competent for a principal to liml
the authority of his agent and if such limitatio11,
have been brought to the attention of thr p:1rliwith whom the ag-ent is dealing the power to liiwl
the principal is defined thereby. Accordingly, thr
_general rule is that one who deals with an agent,
knowing that he is clothed with a limited or rircumscrihed authority and that his art tra11.;;r•rJ11],
his powers, cannot hold his principal. This i,
true whether the agent is a general or a sprci~I
one, for a principal ma~T limit the anthorit~· of onii
as well as the other. Clearly, a limitation hy the
principal of the agent's authority commnnicalf'cl
to a third party is effective to excuse th0 principill
from liability to that third pa rt~T for arts by the
agent in excess of the limit prescribed; and a pPrson dealing with an agent must usE' reasonable
diligence and prudence- to ascertain whethrr the
agent is acting within the scope of his power~. It
follows that the principal is not bound, rm the
basis of either actual or apparent a1dhority. if
the thi~d person dealing with the ape11.f k1101cs or
should know, the limitations placed by thr pri11cipal on the agent's authority and that the a11r11f
is exteeding it.
"Whenerer a. person who dealt with a11 agrnl
had notice of lack of authority or was put 011 ''.1°
tice by the circumstan('es, is ordinarily a quesf'/IJ//

8

,
,

,

'

1

i

•

;

of facts fnr the trier of facts, and not one of law."
( ~~mphasis added)

ln n'viewing the evidence most favorable to the
, 11 cl·e,;;sful party at trial, namely, the Respondent, it is
,ot ,Jjfficnlt to understand how the trial court arrived at
ir: decision. The State Road Commission right of way
contrad referred to Mr. Alden S. Adams as an escrow
;1gP11t anll the terms stated in the contract were subject
lo approval by the State Road Commission and the final
1·:;(•cnled document indicates that, in fact, the approval
,if thl' SI n tc Road Commission was obtained 9 days suh,11qul'llt to th(' date of the contract (exhibit D-7) and the
1 xeeutio11 hy the AppPllants.
If the contracts were read
!:\the Appellants, as conreclcd by ~Ir. F. Ephraim Bates,
.\11prllants were ginn sufficient notice of the limited aull1orit.v· of l\fr. Alden S. Adams and were required to
i111p1ire into his authority. The question of whether AplH%rnt.c: had sufficient notice of authority or whether
\ppl'llants were put on notiee hy the circumstances sur1011rnli11g the transaction, being a question of fact to be
1ldenui11rd by the try er of the facts, it must be presumed
:o han• been decided in favor of the successful party at
lriul, narnrly the Respondents.
1

1

Next, the Appellants feel that they are the victims
of either misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the

trrms of the right of way contract (P-3) or wording of
ll1e wanauty deed (P-2) and in support of such conli·n1 ion insist that the letters from l\fr. Alden S. Adams
IL/ <111(1 D-8) are adequate proof of their position .
1

.\ <'arpfu] reading of the letters, however, and all of
'lie· d<1c·nrnents on exhibit in no way establishes that the
9

terms of the right of way agreement or the \\arran\
deed are contingent upon the State paying the Appel
lants additional severance damage or providiug 8 nh~ 1 ;
tute facilities for watering li\·estock. On the contrun
the ·warranty deed clearly emphasized the faet thnt n; 1: ~
State was purchasing land from the Appellants togdher
with controlled access and i11 clear print on the top of
the page of the warranty deed we find the word~ in p:i
renthesis "controlled access." Again, in tlw la:-;t pnra
graph of the warranty deed we find that tlic Aprwllant~
conveyed to Respondents "a1l rights of i119re.-·s to 1u11!
egress from the remaining pro1Jerty config11011s to ln111is
hereby conveyed to or from said higl111'ay."
In exhibit P-3 we find that each sentence inclntlt~'
the words ''damages for controlled access'' and !he
''control of egress and ingress from and to the highway from Appellants' land'' is emphasized fin timi''·
The Appellants were full:- apprised that thc eonstrnrtion of the Interstate highway would prennt them from
gaining access to the ·water in Silver Creek and 011 t•r11,;<examination, J\Ir. F. Ephraim Bates, one of tl1c AppPllants, testified that he signed the same. ('J'R. Feb. ~(I
and 23, 1967, page 27, line 22 to page 28, line Hi.) Under
these circumstances, it is difficult to understand ho11
the Appellants could hm·e misunderstoo(l or could lime
been mislead by misrepresentation as to the terms of th 1
right of way contract and the deed which the~- executed
in behalf of the State of Utah.
Assuming, for the sake of tbr arg-umrnt, !ha! tlil·
Appellants were mislead by certain statements a11c1 docn-
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nwids, or assummg that the Appellants misunderstood
tJw terms of the right of way contract arnl the Deed exel'nted hy them, Appellants were given numerous opportunitil'S to rescind all contracts and agreements of settleuwnt aml re-try the prior lawsuit together with the sub,1.,111e11t lawsuit in a single hearing to provide them the
rpporhmity to remedy whatever injustice the Appellau!s frlt lwfrll them from such misrepresentations or
nu~mHlcrstanclings.
Counsel for Respondent, prior to
any !1earillg-, offered to re-try the elltire case and counoel for Hespomlent made such offer again at pre-trial.
flnr lo the Appellants' claim of misrepresentation and
misunderstanding-, tlw Court ruled that all of the issues
,!Jould he re-tried in one single hearing and the Appel]p,11ts t;lionlrl refnncl to Respondent any sums received by
:\wcllants on the prior proceeding together with inter1·st aR a condition to re-try the entire lawsuit. The Appellants ''ere given six months to repay the sum received
liy tlwm, namely, $8864.00. N ot"withstanding all of the
r,ffns to re-try the entire lawsuit, the Appellants refused
tn n'fund the necessary money and re-try the case. The
Appellants insisted on being paid additional sums over
~nr1 above what was originally received by them for the
nllegecl deprivation of watering facilities and control of
aeeess. If it may be assumed that the Appellants belicYrd that the warranty deed and right of way contract
'igned by them carried with it certain contingencies
1
1liich WNe not fulfilled, and if Respondent believed that
tlte ('\ecntion of the documents carried no contingencies,
:Ill' effort of such bilateral mistake is to nullify the
11rnd. (17 Am. Jur. 2d, 491, Contracts, Sections 143
1 11 1
'

11

and 144.) Further, assuming Appellants' mo 8 t 8u 1.1·
' 011,
accusations to be true, namely, that the Respondent \\; 1,
guilty of misrepresentation in inducing Appellanh 1,,
execute the deed and contract for procurement of Jii"I·
way right of way, the remedy is still avoic1ancr of tJ1,,
documents executed. (17 Am . .Jur., 501 through 506, l'ori.
tracts, Section 151 to 154.) Appellants were afforrlP: •.
several opportunities to avoid the terms of the (h·:
ments complained of awl to present evidence to sh11i,
what they believed to be just compensation for the qJi 1
of the land taken and severance to the remaining la11il I
The Appellants refused this remedy.
i
'I

!

'1

Upon election of the Appellants, a trial wa8 he],! i
which was restricted to the issues of land valuei,; for tli1
additional taking and Appellants also put on evitle11e(' !
in an attempt to show that tlH7 were entitled to addi !
tional damages from the control of access ancl the allrgcil
deprivation of water. The Respondent put on evidrmr ·
to contradict such evidence. The Court found again<!
the Appellants and in favor of the Respondent, holdi11~
that the Appellants were paid for their alleged c1rpri1a
tion of water and severance to the land remaining in till' ,
prior proceeding and, therefore, should not reeorn
again for the same items and, therefore, onl~T the value of
the land for the additiom1l taking was inclmle<l in th 1· :
award to the Appellants.
1

The Appellants now complain that the affirmauce of
the Trial Court's findings would cause Appellants tn
suffer manifest injustice from unfair d0a!i11gs allCl in
equities and such affirmance would, in essenee, permit thl'
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to renege on its agreement and obligation .
.\ppc!laHts fnrther argue that to demand that they reinru the money received by them to the Respondellt, the
;:itatc Road Commission, after these many years with intrmt as suggested by the Court, places them at a great
clisndrnntagr. It should be noted that the Court offered
io withhold the assessment of interest until the final dis11usitin11 of the entire case if tried denovo and further
,,.<1rc the Appellants six months in which to repay the
principal :mm received hy them. Respondent cannot conceiYc rd any off er more generous than to offer Appellants
tlir opportuHity to rxonerate themselves from any and
nil contracts entered into between Respondents and
.ippellants m1cl to put all of the issues which they com11lain of into a single lawsuit and proceeding. Having
refused this chance, the Appellants should not now be
i1earc1 to complain of inequities, injustices and unfair
rlealing-s. The Respondent could not have made a more
gc11c•rous offer to remedy whatever wrong Appellants
fdt hefell them.
Hc~polJ(lcnt

I

POINT III
TIIE~ TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ENTER
FTNDINGS OF FACT AND JUDGMENT ON
1'~URNISHING APPELLANTS A GATE, RIPRAP AND CULVERT, IF ERROR, IS HARML'BJSS ERROR AND A STIPULATION IN
RFJCORD BY RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL
RINDS RESPONDENT ON FURNISHING
'rIIE ITEMS COMPLAINED OF.
Rrspondent does not deny that it is obligated to pro1i1le the Appellants with a gate, certain rip-rap on a
'trrarn crossing Appellants' property and a culvert to

13

permit crossing a ditch on Appellanh;' property. 'it
r:rrial Court's failure to enter Findings of Fact and .fud~
ment on these items does not warrant a reversal of tlie
entire case, however. Counsel for the Respondrnt stipu
lated that these miscellaneous items ·would he furni~Jw
to Appellants, such stipulation hm'ing been made ill oper,
court and appearing in the record, the Appellants WPri·
afforded sufficient safeguard as to the stipulation liy ~Pe
tion 78-51-32, U. C. A. 1953, which provides that under
certain circumstances, counsel may hind his client. :l[o 1 ~.
over, the Judgment of the lower court may he ame11derl
to include the providing of miscellaneous items to pro
ted the Appellants if this procedure is deemed nemsan.

1

CONCLUSION
In Yiew of the eYidenc<> pr<>sented in the ](:wpr Court
and in \'iew of the manner in which the Court's dPcisi011
was arriYecl at, Respondent respectfully suhmits that
tlw trial Court's ruling was amply supported hy thr cridence and the .Judgment of the lower Comt should lie
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorne:-;' Genernl

KENNETH 1\f. HTSATAKFJ
Special Assistant Attorney
General
431 South Third East, Suite 10~
Salt Lake Cit~', Utah 8..J.111
Attonrev for Rcs7w1ulc11I
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